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Out of all quasi-international tribunals established in the 1990-2000 by the international community 
the Sierra Leone Special Court stands out when it comes to prosecution of rape and sexual crimes 
committed during the civil war in the country. The court, which combines both international and 
national elements, was established by the United Nations upon request from the Sierra Leonean 
government in 2002. The article looks at the background surrounding the establishment of the tribunal 
as well as factors that enabled prosecution of wartime rape and sexual assaults within that tribunal. 
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Background: wartime rape  
in the Sierra Leonean context
The nine-year civil war in Sierra Leone was 
fought between the Sierra Leone Army and the 
government-aligned Civil Defense Force against 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), which 
aimed to overthrow the government. RUF was 
notorious for its atrocities committed against 
civilian population, including rape, mutilations 
and the kidnapping of children. On 7 July 1999, 
the Lomé Peace Agreement officially ended the 
war by offering amnesty to RUF and a power-
sharing arrangement with the rebels. In the 
period 1991-1999, between 1 to 2 million people 
became refugees, 50 000 died, 5000-10 000 
became amputees, 5000-10 000 were raped and 
10 000 children were forcibly recruited to fight 
(Beigbeder, 2002:179). Physicians for Human 
Rights conducted a survey on the issue of sexual 
violence, and found that 89 % of the respondents 
(in four locales) reported to have been raped, 
33 %-gang raped. Most of the victims were raped 
by RUF soldiers. Rape was often accompanied 
by mutilations or sexual slavery. The level of 
pregnancy was high. Women believed to have 
been virgins were specifically targeted for abuse. 
Sexual violence against men was also widespread 
(Amowitz, 2002: 513-521). The Human Rights 
Watch report also highlighted that women were 
often abducted by the rebels, virgins were often 
singled out, though not necessarily.1
It has to be noted that the Sierra Leone 
conflict (and rape, in particular) did not receive 
much international coverage. According to B. 
Nowrojee, “throughout the decade of conflict, 
most journalists paid little or no attention (and 
subsequently failed to publicize) the widespread 
and ongoing attacks directed against women and 
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girls. Sexual violence was Sierra Leone’s invisible 
war crime” (Nowrojee, 2005: 87). Unlike the 
conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the conflict 
in Sierra Leone never involved the targeting of a 
specific group (which is why it was impossible 
to agree on the inclusion of genocide within the 
subject-matter jurisdiction). However, because 
of images of amputations and mutilations during 
“Operation No Living Thing” undertaken by 
paramilitaries and later on, the violations of the 
Lomé Peace Accords that talk of involvement in 
the conflict began in the Security Council (Fritz 
and Smith, 2001: 394).
In June 1998, the UN Observer Mission 
was established in Sierra Leone by the Security 
Council. The UNOMSIL team, in cooperation 
with the ECOMOG (Military Observer Group 
of the Economic Community of West African 
States) began investigations into human rights 
abuses.
The fighting and atrocities did not stop 
with the signing of Lomé Peace Agreement, 
however. They continued into 2000 and 2001. 
The continuation of atrocities challenged the 
legitimacy of the amnesty, and Sierra Leone 
government accordingly requested the United 
Nations to create a special tribunal. The President 
of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, in his 
letter to the United Nations asked assistance 
in bringing to justice those responsible for the 
atrocities committed during the country’s civil 
war. The country had no resources to initiate 
criminal investigations, but it had a strong 
determination to do so. 
Establishing the Special Court  
for Sierra Leone
Security Council Resolution 1315 (August 
14, 2000) called on the Secretary-General to start 
negotiations with Sierra Leone on the issue of 
creating the Court. A formal agreement on the 
project was reached in January 2002 in Freetown. 
The Court became operational in July 2002. The 
Parliament of the country ratified the agreement 
and enacted implementing legislation. 
The question may be posed as to why a 
quasi-international tribunal, rather than a truly 
international one, was established. One of the 
reasons might be a lack of political support for 
creating another expensive international tribunal 
(the so-called “Tribunal fatigue” of the Security 
Council). Establishment of the court was the 
result of joint efforts by the Security Council and 
the government of Sierra Leone. In accounting 
for Sierra Leone’s interests in creating the 
tribunal, one has to consider the issue of amnesty 
granted by Lomé Agreement signed on 8 July 
1999. Security Council passed a resolution on 20 
August 1999, in which it welcomed the signing 
of the peace agreement, even though it meant 
impunity for human rights violators. The UN 
Secretary General’s special representative to 
Sierra Leone objected to the validity of amnesty, 
arguing that those who committed war crimes, 
crimes against humanity or genocide shouldn’t 
be granted amnesty (McDonald, 2002: 123). 
Combatants of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) failed to observe the peace agreement 
provisions and continued to attack civilians. In 
May 2000, they captured 500 UN peace-keepers. 
On 14 August 2000, the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1315 (2000), which called for bringing 
criminals to justice, in the light of “very serious 
crimes committed within the territory of Sierra 
Leone against the people of Sierra Leone and 
United Nations and associated personnel and at 
the prevailing situation of impunity.”2 With the 
government calling for the establishment of a 
tribunal (which already held some suspects in 
custody) and the U.S. and the U.K. expressing 
their support for prosecutions, the plan for a 
hybrid tribunal came into being.
The date of 30 November 1996 was selected 
as the beginning of rationae temporis jurisdiction 
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(to begin at the outbreak of hostilities in 1991 was 
deemed to have been too heavy a burden on the 
Court). On 30 November 1996, the parties sought 
a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In any case, 
the period from 1996 was believed to encompass 
the most serious crimes. One of the three trial 
judges and two of the five appeal judges were 
appointed by the Sierra Leone government.
Subject-matter jurisdiction was a combination 
of crimes prohibited both internationally 
and nationally. They included crimes against 
humanity, violations of common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol 
II, as well as crimes against peace-keepers and 
the recruitment of children. Sexual offenses 
against 13-14 year-old girls were included as 
part of domestic law.3 In general, the Court was 
designed to prosecute only those who “bear 
greater responsibility for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.” Genocide was not included in 
the subject-matter jurisdiction, since there was no 
consensus that crimes committed in the course 
of the conflict amounted to genocide.4 Generally, 
the Statute extends the ICTY and ICTR reference 
to rape as a crime against humanity by explicitly 
including other categories of crime, such as 
forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution and other forms of sexual assault.5 
The Statute also calls for an appointment of staff 
with experience in gender-related crimes (Article 
15.4). Rules of procedure and evidence contain 
witness-friendly provisions (related to consent, 
for instance).6 In general, there has been a number 
of problems outlined by scholars, which could 
impede effective prosecution of rape and sexual 
violence, such as no express provision prohibiting 
the questioning of prior or subsequent sexual 
conduct of the victim. 
The first indictments, issued on 7 March 
2003, were followed by a number of arrests. 
Despite fears that the difficulties in the Statute 
might impede investigations and prosecutions 
of rape, out of 13 original indictments, 10 
contained charges of rape (it is worth noting that 
these charges were included in the indictments 
from the beginning, rather than later, by way of 
amending an indictment, as was the case in the 
ICTR)7 Ten of the accused were apprehended. 
One of the indictments was issued against Charles 
Taylor, then the President of Liberia (charging 
him, inter alia, with rape), but Taylor obtained 
asylum in Nigeria in August 2003.8 Ex-corporal 
Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF died in custody, 
Sam Bockarie was reported dead in Liberia and 
Johnny Paul Koroma went into hiding.
The first trials began in June 2004. One 
of the defendants was Sam Hinga Norman, the 
deputy defense minister, a controversial figure 
with considerable popularity.
The defendants were charged with war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and violations 
of international humanitarian law, including 
murder, rape, looting, burning, attacks on peace-
keepers, and so on. OTP’s Investigation Section 
was charged with collecting information.
The number of indictments containing rape 
and sexual violence is quite striking. It has to be 
born in mind that the Court has a limited time 
frame and limited resources (it has to complete 
the trials by the end of 2006 and is financed 
by voluntary contributions). Given these time 
constraints, the Chief Prosecutor has to make 
strategic choices as to what indictments to file. 
The Prosecutor’s office was willing to include 
rape and sexual violence among the charges. The 
role of David Crane, the former Chief Prosecutor, 
is often emphasized: “The original Chief 
Prosecutor, David M. Crane, was very active 
in bringing charges on crimes of rape, sexual 
slavery and – a new count under “other inhumane 
acts” – forced marriage.”9 Crane has made a 
considerable effort to investigate and prosecute for 
sexual violence. He “spearheaded a prosecution 
strategy that incorporated sexual violence crimes 
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from the outset, which was consistently followed 
by the staff on a daily basis. The work of the 
Special Court has repeatedly demonstrated that, 
even with extreme constraints, the political will 
of the prosecutor and his senior staff can shift 
the balance toward justice for victims of sexual 
crimes” (Nowrojee, 2005: 99).10 Crane appointed 
experienced female investigators to deal with 
this kind of crime. Chief of Prosecutions, Luc 
Cote, “followed through to ensure inclusion of 
this evidence in the courtroom and has dedicated 
a trial attorney to the prosecution plan for the 
sexual violence crimes” (Nowrojee, 2005 : 100). 
The role of non-judicial mechanisms  
in addressing wartime rape  
and sexual violence
A Truth Commission was established 
by Sierra Leone Parliament at approximately 
the same time and was operating parallel to 
the Court.11 The UN High Commissioner on 
Human Rights provided substantial assistance 
to the government in drafting the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Act in 2000. The 
Commission itself was housed as a project of the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in Geneva. One of the most controversial 
aspects of the Sierra Leone Special Court was 
the prosecution of minors. In the course of 
the conflict, a large number of atrocities were 
committed by child soldiers, who themselves had 
been abducted, forced to take drugs and induced 
to commit crimes. An important issue was how 
to reintegrate child offenders into society. Thus, 
the Security Council noted that, “the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission will have a major 
role to play in the case of juvenile offenders, and 
the members of the Security Council encourage 
the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations to develop suitable institutions, including 
specific provisions, related to children, to this 
end”[UN Doc.S/2000/1234]. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission became an important 
actor in addressing crimes committed by children. 
This non-judicial mechanism was also crucial in 
hearing testimonies from victims (if the victim 
agreed to give a deposition). Since the Court was 
designed to prosecute only high-ranking officials, 
the Truth Commission provided the opportunity 
for the victims to come forward with their stories. 
Priscilla Hayner in the ICTJ report notes that a 
significant number of perpetrators came forward 
to the Truth Commission, “more than 13 percent 
of the 8000 individual statements are directly 
from the perpetrators, and approximately a third 
of those who appeared in the hearings admitted to 
their own wrongs, often in front of the TRC during 
its initial hearings, but after seeing that there was 
no reaction from the Special Court for those that 
did testify, many clamored for the opportunity 
to speak” [ICTJ: 4]. The Sierra Leonean TC 
“developed a methodology to uncover accounts 
of sexual violence. The Commission decided that 
women should make their statements to women 
statement-takers trained to deal with accounts 
involving rape and sexual violence. In addition, 
Commissioners and staff held public ‘town hall’ 
meetings and reached out to many women’s 
groups and agencies dealing with women, 
educating them about the goals of the TRC. The 
Commissioners also accepted suggestions and 
aid from these organizations.”12
National and international NGOs cooperated 
with the government, the Truth Commission 
and the Special Court. They organized marches 
demonstrating solidarity with rape victims. 
Women’s organizations were frequently contacted 
by the Truth Commission to encourage them 
to participate in the hearings. The Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, as 
well as policewomen from Family Support Units 
also attended the hearings. Trainings for women’s 
organizations were often held by UNIFEM. One 
of the Organizations actively working in Sierra 
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Leone was Physicians for Human Rights. They 
collected evidence of abuses and provided direct 
help to survivors. Human Rights Watch was also 
involved in documenting abuses. Workshops 
on gender crimes have been held by the Court, 
with the participation of Sierra Leonean women’s 
groups. “The Outreach Section has liaised with 
a broad range of Civil Society groups, including 
a number of women’s groups, prominent Sierra 
Leonean women, and so on.”13 Sierra Leone 
Special Court sought not only to investigate 
and prosecute these crimes, but also to expand 
the scope of international humanitarian law to 
include “forced marriage” as a crime against 
humanity. 14
Conclusion
To date, out of the four quasi-international 
tribunals, the Sierra Leone Special Court, 
although criticized for its use of selective justice 
(it was meant to prosecute only senior officials), 
seems to have been the most effective. It was 
able to bring to trial a number of important 
defendants. Efforts were also made to disseminate 
information about the proceedings to the public, 
there were no apparent financial complications. 
A reason for the comparative success in 
serving justice is, first of all, the government’s 
willingness to cooperate with the Court and, 
importantly, international support-particularly 
that of the United States--in providing financial 
help and professionals. Commitment on the part 
of the Prosecutor and his office (as well as the 
Truth Commission staff) was instrumental in 
making sure that rape and sexual violence were 
recognized as one of the most serious crimes 
committed in the conflict. “The work of the 
Special Court has repeatedly demonstrated that, 
even with extreme constraints, the political will 
of the Prosecutor and his senior staff can shift 
the balance toward justice for victims of sexual 
crimes” (Nowrojee, 2005: 99). 
1 “We’’ll Kill You if You Cry”. Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leonean Conflict. Human Rights Watch. January 2003. Avail-
able at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sierraleone/sierleon0103.pdf. 
2 SC Res.1315 (2000). Available at: http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/1315 %20
(2000)&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC. 
3 Article 5 (crimes under Sierra Leonean law): “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute the per-
sons who have committed the following crimes under Sierra Leonean law : a. Offenses relating to the abuse of 
girls under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1926…i. Abusing a girl under 13 years of age, contrary 
to section 6 ; ii. Abusing a girl between 13 and 14 years of age, contrary to section 7 ; iii. Abduction of a girl 
for immoral purposes, contrary to section 12.” Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Available at: 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw %3D&. 
4 Articles 2-5 of the Statute list the crimes that can be prosecuted. Article 2 covers crimes against humanity. 
Article 3 covers violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (law 
applicable in an internal armed conflict). Article 4 lists “other serious violations of international humanitarian 
law”, and Article 5-“crimes under Sierra Leonean law”. Ibid. 
5 See Article 2: “The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the following 
crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attach against any civilian population:…c. Enslavement…f. 
Torture; g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual vio-
lence; h. Persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious groups; i. Other inhumane acts.” Article 3: “The 
Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission of serious 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions…and of Additional Protocol II…These violations 
shall include: a. Violence to life, health and physical and mental well-being of persons, in particular, murder 
as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment…c. Outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form 
of indecent assault…h. Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.” Ibid. 
6 Rule 96 (i)-(iii). Available at: http://www.sc-sl.org/DOCUMENTS/tabid/176/Default.aspx. 
7 See Prosecutor v.Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 (Indictment), 3 March 2003; Prosecu-
tor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02 (Indictment), 3 March 2003; Prosecutor v. Johnny 
Paul Koroma, Case No. SCSL-2003-03 (Indictment), 3 March 2003; Prosecutor v. Sam Bocharie, Case No. 
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SCSL-2003-04 (Indictment), 3 March 2003; Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT 
(Indictment), 5 February 2004; Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Case No. CSL-2004- 016-PT (Indictment), 
5 February 2004; Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT (Indictment), 5 February 2004; 
Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT (Indictment), 5 February 2004; Prosecutor v. 
Brima Bazzy Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-016-PT (Indictment), 5 February 2004; and Prosecutor v. Santi-
gie Borbor Kanu, Case No. SCSL-1004-016-PT (Indictment), 5 February 2004. Available at: www.sc-sl.org. 
Shaoli Sarkar mentioned, for instance, that in the AFRC and RUF trials, “sexual violence formed a critical 
part of the charges against accused persons for both of these cases. Counts 6 through 9 of the amended indict-
ments for the AFRC and RUF trials include charges of sexual violence. Of the 59 AFRC and 98 RUF wit-
nesses, 11 AFRC and 16 RUF witnesses testified about an act of sexual violence inflicted upon their persons. 
” E-mail from Shaoli Sarkar, OTP, May 5, 2006. On file with the author. 
8 Charles Taylor was apprehended and handed over to the Special Court on 29 March 2006 following pressure 
exercised on Nigeria by the U.S. government. Taylor made his first appearance before the Court on 3 April 
2006, and pleaded not guilty to all the 11 counts of the indictment (which include war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual slavery and muti-
lations). However, for fear that his trial might disrupt peace in the country, requests were made to try Taylor 
in the International Criminal Court in the Hague. For more, see, for example: Charles Taylor’s Initial Appear-
ance // U.C.B. War Crimes Studies Center, Sierra Leone Trial Monitoring Project Special Report. April 3, 
2006. Available at: http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/documents/Taylor-Specialreport_001.pdf.
9 E-mail from a SLSC official, April 28, 2006. On file with the author. 
10 The importance of the political will of the prosecutor and his staff was also mentioned by Patricia Sellers, 
gender advisor at the ICTY, who added that the Special Court staff had meetings with the ICTY team, and 
it was emphasized that crimes of rape and sexual violence should not be overlooked in the Special Court. 
Interview with Patricia Sellers. ICTY. May 3, 2006. On file with the author. 
11 The Truth Commission was established to promote reconciliation and was mandated to “pay special attention 
to the subject of sexual abuse.” The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act (Sierra Leone). Available at: 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2000-4.pdf. The TC functioned from mid-2002 until 2004. It produced its 
final report and recommendations in 2004. 
12 E-mail from Shaoli Sarkar, OTP. May 5, 2006. On file with the author.
13 E-mail from a SLSC official, April 28, 2006. On file with the author. 
14 “The Prosecutor has creatively used the section of “other inhumane acts” under crimes against humanity-a 
seriousness to the enumerated crimes-to expand legal recognition for the types of sexual violence that women 
endure in conflict” (Nowrojee, 2005: 101). As noted above, the Statute itself is more expansive than those of 
the ICTY and the ICTR.
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Политические аспекты  
рассмотрения изнасилований  
в Специальном суде Сьерра-Леоне
Г.А. Нелаева
Тюменский государственный университет 
Россия 625003, Тюмень, ул. Семакова, 10
Девятилетняя гражданская война в Сьерра-Леоне велась между армией страны и про-
правительственными Гражданскими оборонными силами (Civil Defense Force) против 
Революционного объединенного фронта (Revolutionary United Front). Среди преступлений, 
совершенных в ходе конфликта, были изнасилования и насильственные действия сексуального 
характера, нередко сопровождавшиеся увечьями или сексуальным рабством. Военные 
столкновения и преступления не закончились с подписанием мирных соглашений в Ломе и 
продолжались в 2000 и 2001 годах. Таким образом, правительство страны приняло решение 
обратиться к ООН с просьбой создать специальный трибунал для осуществления правосудия 
над лицами, ответственными за преступления, совершенные во время гражданской войны. В 
статье рассматривается политика Специального суда Сьерра-Леоне в области уголовного 
преследования индивидов за совершение изнасилований в ходе вооруженного конфликта, так 
как несмотря на ограниченные временные рамки, ограниченные финансовые возможности и 
другие проблемы практического характера, Суд сумел разработать определенную стратегию 
рассмотрения данных преступлений.
Ключевые слова: Специальный суд Сьерра-Леоне, международные трибуналы, изнасилование.
